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AWatch-rus/PRODUCTION_READINESS_REPORT.md
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TASK_065: Production readiness report

Audit date: 2026-07-01.

Scope: repository-level engineering and operational audit for AWatch-rus Production 1.0 readiness.

Production context: the project is already deployed in a small company environment with approximately 5 RDP users. Stability, rollback, diagnostics and maintainability have priority over new functionality.

Method

The audit used repository evidence only. No readiness claim in this report is based on an unverified assumption.

Reviewed evidence:

  • README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, SECURITY.md, ROADMAP.md.
  • docs/PROJECT_STATUS_RU.md, docs/RESIDUAL_RISKS_RU.md, docs/QUALITY_STATUS_RU.md, docs/OPERATIONS_VALIDATION_RUNBOOK_RU.md, docs/DLP_OPTIONAL_RUNTIME_RU.md, docs/DLP_RESOURCE_PROFILES_RU.md, docs/POWERSHELL_SCRIPT_STATUS_MATRIX_RU.md.
  • docs/registry/* including registry-evidence-manifest.json.
  • .github/workflows/*.
  • scripts/*, scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/*.
  • adk-rust/ workspace manifests and crate tree.
  • ansible/, aw-server/, windows/, proxmox/, clickhouse-1c/, grafana/, pfsense/.
  • configs/operational-maturity-contract.json.

Commands used for evidence gathering:

git ls-files | wc -l
find adk-rust/crates -maxdepth 2 -name Cargo.toml
cargo metadata --locked --format-version 1
cargo audit --deny warnings
cargo machete --with-metadata
cargo tree --duplicates --locked
cargo deny check --config ../deny.toml --hide-inclusion-graph --show-stats
wc -l adk-rust/crates/detmir-portal/src/main.rs adk-rust/crates/aw-windows-telemetry/src/main.rs proxmox/tsj_guardian_bot.py adk-rust/crates/worktime-api/src/main.rs ansible/deploy_aw_server.yml
sha256sum scripts/aw-contour-diag.sh scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/aw-contour-diag.sh scripts/check_production_inventory_placeholders.sh scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/check_production_inventory_placeholders.sh
rg -n "CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD|--password|password" clickhouse-1c/ops clickhouse-1c/ai clickhouse-1c/etl

Implemented Capability Inventory

Core Runtime

  • Rust workspace under adk-rust/ with 58 crates.
  • ActivityWatch checks and wrappers: check-aw-data, check-aw-full, aw-health-check, aw-rus-healthd, aw-slo-monitor.
  • DetMir portal: Rust HTML/API portal with contracts, metrics, readiness, reports, operator/manager/security views and role-based access logic.
  • Worktime stack: worktime-api, worktime-prewarm, worktime-influx-exporter, worktime-autoheal, worktime-ui-bridge, rdp-worktime-report.
  • Windows telemetry: aw-windows-telemetry for collectors, validation, file-1C upload, DLP evidence sync and collector guard paths.
  • Release/install tooling: rebuild-install-kit, validate-install-kit, verify-innosetup-installer, check-install-kit-vs-repo.

Workforce / 1C / ClickHouse

  • aw-workforce-ingest and aw-1c-ingest exist for workforce and 1C ingestion paths.
  • clickhouse-1c/ includes ETL, SQL, Grafana provisioning and operational wrappers.
  • Grafana dashboards are version-controlled under grafana/ and related ClickHouse/Grafana directories.

Security / DLP / Forensics

  • DLP server-side helpers exist as Rust crates: dlp-policy-engine, dlp-case-management, dlp-compliance, dlp-aggregator, dlp-health-check, dlp-content-analyzer, exporters/senders.
  • DLP production runtime is intentionally conservative: core_only/disabled default with documented light profile and load guard.
  • Security Finding Inbox and Hayabusa/Velociraptor findings paths are optional and separated from Workforce hot path.
  • Hayabusa tooling exists under hayabusa-tools and aw-server/hayabusa/.

Deployment / Operations

  • Ansible deployment exists for server and Windows contours.
  • Windows deployment and recovery scripts exist under windows/.
  • Proxmox/pfSense support assets exist under proxmox/ and pfsense/.
  • Operational wrappers exist at root and under scripts/.
  • scripts/operational-maturity-check.mjs validates API compatibility, fixtures, fault injection, bounded load, config, systemd, ClickHouse migration and observability contracts.

Governance / Release

  • Public CI workflows exist.
  • Security workflow includes cargo audit, cargo deny, secret pattern scan and dependency review.
  • Dependency hygiene workflow includes cargo metadata, machete, duplicates, audit, deny and advisory udeps.
  • Registry-readiness documentation exists under docs/registry/.
  • CODEOWNERS, PR template, review checklist and branch protection evidence docs exist.

Confirmed Gap Analysis

Technical Debt

  • Large modules increase review risk:
    • adk-rust/crates/detmir-portal/src/main.rs: 14200 lines.
    • adk-rust/crates/aw-windows-telemetry/src/main.rs: 6411 lines.
    • proxmox/tsj_guardian_bot.py: 4610 lines.
    • adk-rust/crates/worktime-api/src/main.rs: 3988 lines.
    • ansible/deploy_aw_server.yml: 3099 lines.
  • PowerShell fallback remains necessary and documented; it is not dead code, but it increases parity and validation burden.

Duplicated Logic

  • Exact duplicate scripts confirmed by SHA256:
    • scripts/aw-contour-diag.sh
    • scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/aw-contour-diag.sh
    • scripts/check_production_inventory_placeholders.sh
    • scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/check_production_inventory_placeholders.sh

Outdated Or Pending Documentation

  • docs/PROJECT_STATUS_RU.md still records first reviewed PR evidence as pending and contains historical required check names.
  • docs/RESIDUAL_RISKS_RU.md records Gitea restore test, build-runner, release evidence and legal package as open.
  • ROADMAP.md records coverage threshold and Russian OS compatibility as planned, not complete.

Obsolete Or Deprecated Components

  • Some Ansible DLP roles are explicitly marked deprecated because they deployed old service paths.
  • serde_yaml 0.9.34+deprecated is documented as a medium third-party risk.
  • Legacy scripts remain as fallback/reference; they should not be removed without parity gates.

Missing Operational Checks

  • No confirmed repository check currently proves production binary SHA parity across all actually running units/timers/tasks and local release artifacts.
  • Retention/cleanup policy for long-lived state/evidence/diagnostic output is not yet complete.
  • Existing operational maturity bounded load is useful, but does not yet cover Production 1.0 scale scenarios for 5/20/50 users and portal/worktime prewarm.

Missing Tests

  • Load regression tests for portal/worktime full report and prewarm hot paths are not yet sufficient for Production 1.0 scale confidence.
  • Windows Rust validation parity still needs canary evidence against the PowerShell validation path.

Security Gaps

  • ClickHouse/1C ops wrappers pass CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD via --password, which exposes secrets in process argv.
  • cargo deny passes but currently permits non-blocking duplicate/wildcard dependency warnings. This is not an immediate vulnerability, but it needs a Production 1.0 baseline.

Readiness Scores

Scoring scale:

  • 90-100: production-ready with evidence.
  • 75-89: strong, but with bounded gaps.
  • 60-74: usable in current production, but not yet 1.0 release-grade.
  • below 60: material blocker.
Category Score Justification
Architecture status 82 Rust-first runtime, documented boundaries and conservative DLP separation exist. Large modules remain maintainability risk.
Repository health 80 910 tracked files, clear ownership areas and runbooks. Some duplicate scripts and historical docs remain.
Dependency health 78 Audit and machete pass; 349 packages; cargo deny exits 0. Remaining deny warnings and duplicate roots need baseline policy.
CI health 82 CI/security/coverage/dependency/operational workflows exist. Toolchain drift remains between pinned 1.94.0 and floating stable.
Operational maturity 84 Offline operational maturity harness covers compatibility, fixtures, fault injection, bounded load, config and observability. Production-scale load gate still needed.
Documentation status 78 Extensive docs and runbooks exist. Current-state docs need cleanup around historical statuses and pending evidence.
Security status 76 Secret scan, audit, deny and conservative claims exist. ClickHouse password-in-argv is a direct hygiene gap.
Testing status 80 Full Rust pipeline recently passed and operational smokes exist. Missing scale/load and Windows parity evidence remain.
Deployment readiness 76 Ansible, Windows install kit, runbooks and wrappers exist. Install kit stale-payload gate and production binary parity still missing.
Upgrade readiness 72 Release scripts and rollback docs exist, but controlled release evidence and binary parity are not proven.
Recovery readiness 70 Recovery runbooks and backups exist; Gitea restore test is not done.
Configuration validation 82 Operational maturity validates JSON/YAML/systemd/ClickHouse files; production inventory placeholder checks exist. Coverage must be extended to retention/binary parity.
Observability 84 Metrics contract and operational maturity observability checks exist; capacity metrics need scale scenarios.
Support readiness 78 Many runbooks exist and DetMir guardrails are strong; docs need current-state cleanup for 1.0.
Maintainability 72 Strong tests and Rust-first direction, but large files and fallback parity increase maintenance cost.

Overall Production Readiness Score: 78 / 100.

Recommended release decision: not yet Production 1.0. The project is fit for the current small production/pilot environment with conservative runtime guardrails, but Production 1.0 should wait until P0 blockers in DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_NEXT.md are closed and evidenced.

Risk Assessment

High Risk

  1. Production binary drift

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: running binaries may not match reviewed release artifacts.
    • Mitigation: implement production binary parity gate.
    • Complexity: medium.

  2. Missing controlled release evidence

    • Probability: high.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: GitHub mirror validation is not release evidence.
    • Mitigation: controlled runner release evidence build.
    • Complexity: medium.

  3. Untested repository restore

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: backup exists, but restore is not proven.
    • Mitigation: separate-host restore drill.
    • Complexity: medium.

  4. Unbounded operational artifacts

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: state/evidence/diagnostic artifacts can accumulate and fill disks.
    • Mitigation: allowlisted retention and cleanup policy.
    • Complexity: medium.

  5. ClickHouse password in process argv

    • Probability: high on affected scripts.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: local process listing can expose credentials.
    • Mitigation: remove password from argv and verify with ps.
    • Complexity: low-medium.

  6. Portal/worktime hot-path overload

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: high.
    • Description: full report/snapshot prewarm remains documented as CPU/IO expensive.
    • Mitigation: Production 1.0 load gate with synthetic datasets.
    • Complexity: medium-high.

Medium Risk

  1. CI toolchain drift

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: medium.
    • Mitigation: align workflows to pinned toolchain.
    • Complexity: low.

  2. Dependency warning drift

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: medium.
    • Mitigation: baseline current warnings and block new unapproved warnings.
    • Complexity: medium.

  3. Windows validation parity gap

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: medium-high.
    • Mitigation: Rust/PowerShell canary comparison.
    • Complexity: medium.

  4. Install kit stale payload

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: medium-high.
    • Mitigation: install kit manifest and validation gate.
    • Complexity: medium.

  5. Documentation drift

    • Probability: high.
    • Impact: medium.
    • Mitigation: current-state cleanup and historical labeling.
    • Complexity: low-medium.

  6. Large module maintainability

    • Probability: high.
    • Impact: medium.
    • Mitigation: incremental extraction with tests.
    • Complexity: medium-high.

Low Risk

  1. Exact duplicate diagnostic scripts

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: low-medium.
    • Mitigation: canonical implementation or drift check.
    • Complexity: low.

  2. Coverage threshold not yet enforced

    • Probability: medium.
    • Impact: low for current production, medium long-term.
    • Mitigation: baseline review, advisory threshold, later blocking policy.
    • Complexity: medium.

  3. Russian OS compatibility not yet matrixed

    • Probability: low for current DetMir, medium for wider distribution.
    • Impact: medium for new deployments.
    • Mitigation: compatibility matrix with evidence.
    • Complexity: medium-high.

Known Limitations

  • The audit did not claim legal readiness, certification or registry submission completion.
  • The audit did not validate live production services during this documentation update.
  • Heavy DLP, Loki and always-on Velociraptor are intentionally not required for Production 1.0.
  • PowerShell fallback remains a supported rollback/support path until parity evidence allows retirement.

Release Readiness Summary

Production 1.0 should be blocked on:

  1. production binary parity evidence;
  2. controlled release evidence build;
  3. Gitea restore drill;
  4. bounded retention/cleanup;
  5. ClickHouse password argv fix;
  6. portal/worktime hot-path load gate.

After these are complete, the project can reasonably move from current small production/pilot readiness to Production 1.0 readiness, assuming validation passes and no new runtime regressions are introduced.

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