Add shadow security finding inbox

adk-rust/Cargo.lock

@@ -710,7 +710,6 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "clap",
- "serde_json",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

adk-rust/Cargo.toml

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ members = [
     "crates/aw-rus-healthd",
     "crates/detmir-check",
     "crates/detmir-core",
+    "crates/security-finding-inbox",
     "crates/dlp-health-check",
     "crates/dlp-content-analyzer",
     "crates/dlp-admin-cli",
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ members = [
     "crates/detmir-heal-safe",
     "crates/detmir-status",
     "crates/detmir-state",
+    "crates/containment-engine",
     "crates/tsj-guardian-status",
     "crates/tsj-guardian-watchdog",
 ]

adk-rust/crates/aw-1c-ingest/src/main.rs

@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ fn run() -> Result<i32> {
             &root.join("detections/open_cases_from_detections.sql"),
             &mut summary,
         )?;
+        let security_inbox_schema = root.join("security/security_finding_inbox.sql");
+        if security_inbox_schema.exists() {
+            run_sql_file(&client, &security_inbox_schema, &mut summary)?;
+        }
         if !cli.skip_briefs {
             let _ = run_optional_script(&root.join("ops/run_manager_brief.sh"));
             let _ = run_optional_script(&root.join("ops/run_recovery_brief.sh"));

adk-rust/crates/containment-engine/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[package]
+name = "containment-engine"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+publish.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true

adk-rust/crates/hayabusa-tools/Cargo.toml

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ reqwest.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 urlencoding.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+zip = { version = "2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tempfile.workspace = true

adk-rust/crates/hayabusa-tools/src/bin/autoprocess.rs

@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
 use std::fs::{self, File};
+use std::io::{self, Read};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use std::process::Command;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
+use chrono::Utc;
 use clap::Parser;
 use fs2::FileExt;
-use hayabusa_tools::{guess_host_from_filename, read_json_file};
+use hayabusa_tools::{env_bool, env_string, guess_host_from_filename, read_json_file};
 use serde_json::{Value, json};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use zip::ZipArchive;
 
 const LOCK_PATH: &str = "/opt/hayabusa/state/aw-hayabusa-autoprocess.lock";
 const WRAPPER: &str = "/usr/local/bin/aw-hayabusa";
 const LINKER: &str = "/usr/local/bin/aw-hayabusa-link-case";
 const CASE_ALERT: &str = "/usr/local/bin/aw-hayabusa-case-alert";
+const SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX: &str = "/usr/local/bin/security-finding-inbox";
 const LATEST_INTAKE: &str = "/opt/hayabusa/state/latest-intake.json";
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
@@ -20,6 +25,9 @@ struct Cli {
     #[arg(long, default_value = "/opt/activitywatch/aw-rus-ops/drop")]
     drop_dir: PathBuf,
 
+    #[arg(long, default_value = "/opt/hayabusa/quarantine/drop")]
+    quarantine_dir: PathBuf,
+
     #[arg(long, default_value_t = true)]
     once: bool,
 }
@@ -65,16 +73,43 @@ fn run() -> Result<i32> {
         println!("no zip packages in drop dir");
         return Ok(0);
     }
+    let mut operational_failures = 0usize;
     for zip_path in zips {
-        let result = process_one(&zip_path)?;
+        if let Err(err) = validate_drop_inputs(&zip_path) {
-        println!(
+            let quarantine_dir = quarantine_drop_package(&cli.quarantine_dir, &zip_path, &err)?;
-            "{}",
+            println!(
-            serde_json::to_string_pretty(&json!({
+                "{}",
-                "processed": zip_path.display().to_string(),
+                serde_json::to_string_pretty(&json!({
-                "latest_intake": result.latest_intake,
+                    "quarantined": zip_path.display().to_string(),
-                "case_alert": result.case_alert,
+                    "quarantine_dir": quarantine_dir.display().to_string(),
-            }))?
+                    "reason": err.to_string(),
-        );
+                }))?
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        match process_one(&zip_path) {
+            Ok(result) => {
+                println!(
+                    "{}",
+                    serde_json::to_string_pretty(&json!({
+                        "processed": zip_path.display().to_string(),
+                        "latest_intake": result.latest_intake,
+                        "case_alert": result.case_alert,
+                        "security_finding_ingest": result.security_finding_ingest,
+                    }))?
+                );
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                operational_failures += 1;
+                eprintln!(
+                    "ERROR: operational failure while processing {}: {err:#}",
+                    zip_path.display()
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if operational_failures > 0 {
+        bail!("{operational_failures} operational Hayabusa package failure(s)");
     }
     Ok(0)
 }
@@ -82,6 +117,7 @@ fn run() -> Result<i32> {
 struct ProcessResult {
     latest_intake: Value,
     case_alert: Option<Value>,
+    security_finding_ingest: Option<Value>,
 }
 
 fn list_zips(drop_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
@@ -96,6 +132,42 @@ fn list_zips(drop_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
     Ok(zips)
 }
 
+fn validate_drop_inputs(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    validate_zip_package(zip_path)?;
+    load_sidecars(zip_path)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn validate_zip_package(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let file = File::open(zip_path).with_context(|| format!("open {}", zip_path.display()))?;
+    let mut archive =
+        ZipArchive::new(file).with_context(|| format!("read zip {}", zip_path.display()))?;
+    if archive.is_empty() {
+        bail!("zip package has no entries: {}", zip_path.display());
+    }
+    for index in 0..archive.len() {
+        let mut entry = archive
+            .by_index(index)
+            .with_context(|| format!("read zip entry {index} from {}", zip_path.display()))?;
+        let name = entry.name().replace('\\', "/");
+        if name.starts_with('/') || name.split('/').any(|part| part == "..") {
+            bail!(
+                "unsafe zip entry in {}: {}",
+                zip_path.display(),
+                entry.name()
+            );
+        }
+        io::copy(&mut entry, &mut io::sink()).with_context(|| {
+            format!(
+                "test zip entry {} from {}",
+                entry.name(),
+                zip_path.display()
+            )
+        })?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 fn process_one(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<ProcessResult> {
     let sidecars = load_sidecars(zip_path)?;
     let host = guess_host(zip_path, &sidecars);
@@ -123,6 +195,7 @@ fn process_one(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<ProcessResult> {
         ],
     )?;
     let latest = read_json_file(Path::new(LATEST_INTAKE))?;
+    let security_finding_ingest = ingest_security_finding_best_effort(Path::new(LATEST_INTAKE))?;
     let report_dir = PathBuf::from(
         latest
             .get("report_dir")
@@ -154,6 +227,7 @@ fn process_one(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<ProcessResult> {
             return Ok(ProcessResult {
                 latest_intake: latest,
                 case_alert,
+                security_finding_ingest,
             });
         }
         run_checked(
@@ -171,9 +245,63 @@ fn process_one(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<ProcessResult> {
     Ok(ProcessResult {
         latest_intake: latest,
         case_alert,
+        security_finding_ingest,
     })
 }
 
+fn ingest_security_finding_best_effort(intake_path: &Path) -> Result<Option<Value>> {
+    if !env_bool("AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_ENABLED", false) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let binary = PathBuf::from(env_string(
+        "AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_BIN",
+        SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX,
+    ));
+    let required = env_bool("AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_REQUIRED", false);
+    if !binary.is_file() {
+        let message = format!(
+            "security finding inbox binary not found: {}",
+            binary.display()
+        );
+        if required {
+            bail!("{message}");
+        }
+        eprintln!("WARNING: {message}");
+        return Ok(Some(json!({"ok": false, "warning": message})));
+    }
+    let min_severity = env_string("AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_MIN_SEVERITY", "medium");
+    let output = Command::new(&binary)
+        .arg("ingest-hayabusa")
+        .arg("--intake")
+        .arg(intake_path)
+        .arg("--min-severity")
+        .arg(min_severity)
+        .output()
+        .with_context(|| format!("run {}", binary.display()))?;
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let message = format!(
+            "security finding ingest failed: status={} stderr={}",
+            output.status,
+            stderr.trim()
+        );
+        if required {
+            bail!("{message}");
+        }
+        eprintln!("WARNING: {message}");
+        return Ok(Some(json!({"ok": false, "warning": message})));
+    }
+    let payload = serde_json::from_str(stdout.trim()).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+        json!({
+            "ok": true,
+            "stdout": stdout.trim(),
+            "stderr": stderr.trim()
+        })
+    });
+    Ok(Some(payload))
+}
+
 fn load_sidecars(zip_path: &Path) -> Result<Sidecars> {
     let base = zip_path.with_extension("");
     let caseid_path = base.with_extension("caseid");
@@ -241,6 +369,108 @@ fn archive_drop_package(report_dir: &Path, zip_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+fn quarantine_drop_package(
+    quarantine_root: &Path,
+    zip_path: &Path,
+    err: &anyhow::Error,
+) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    fs::create_dir_all(quarantine_root)
+        .with_context(|| format!("create {}", quarantine_root.display()))?;
+    let name = zip_path
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|name| name.to_str())
+        .unwrap_or("package.zip");
+    let stamp = Utc::now().format("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ");
+    let mut quarantine_dir = quarantine_root.join(format!("{stamp}_{}", sanitize_component(name)));
+    if quarantine_dir.exists() {
+        quarantine_dir = quarantine_root.join(format!(
+            "{stamp}_{}_{}",
+            sanitize_component(name),
+            std::process::id()
+        ));
+    }
+    fs::create_dir_all(&quarantine_dir)
+        .with_context(|| format!("create {}", quarantine_dir.display()))?;
+
+    let sha256 = if zip_path.is_file() {
+        Some(sha256_file(zip_path)?)
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+    move_if_exists(zip_path, &quarantine_dir)?;
+    let base = zip_path.with_extension("");
+    for sidecar in [
+        base.with_extension("caseid"),
+        base.with_extension("meta.json"),
+        zip_path.with_extension("zip.sha256"),
+    ] {
+        move_if_exists(&sidecar, &quarantine_dir)?;
+    }
+    let reason = json!({
+        "quarantined_at": Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+        "source": "aw-hayabusa-autoprocess-rust",
+        "original_path": zip_path.display().to_string(),
+        "sha256": sha256,
+        "reason": err.to_string(),
+        "detail": format!("{err:#}"),
+        "operator_action": "inspect source package, re-export EVTX archive if needed, then replay by moving a fixed package back to the drop directory",
+    });
+    fs::write(
+        quarantine_dir.join("reason.json"),
+        serde_json::to_string_pretty(&reason)?,
+    )
+    .with_context(|| format!("write {}", quarantine_dir.join("reason.json").display()))?;
+    Ok(quarantine_dir)
+}
+
+fn move_if_exists(path: &Path, target_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    if !path.exists() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let target = target_dir.join(path.file_name().context("quarantine file name")?);
+    fs::rename(path, &target)
+        .or_else(|_| {
+            fs::copy(path, &target)?;
+            fs::remove_file(path)
+        })
+        .with_context(|| format!("move {} to {}", path.display(), target.display()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn sha256_file(path: &Path) -> Result<String> {
+    let mut file = File::open(path).with_context(|| format!("open {}", path.display()))?;
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    let mut buf = [0u8; 8192];
+    loop {
+        let read = file
+            .read(&mut buf)
+            .with_context(|| format!("read {}", path.display()))?;
+        if read == 0 {
+            break;
+        }
+        hasher.update(&buf[..read]);
+    }
+    Ok(format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize()))
+}
+
+fn sanitize_component(value: &str) -> String {
+    let clean = value
+        .chars()
+        .map(|ch| {
+            if ch.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(ch, '.' | '_' | '-') {
+                ch
+            } else {
+                '_'
+            }
+        })
+        .collect::<String>();
+    if clean.is_empty() {
+        "package".to_string()
+    } else {
+        clean
+    }
+}
+
 fn guess_host(zip_path: &Path, sidecars: &Sidecars) -> Option<String> {
     if let Some(host) = &sidecars.host {
         if !host.is_empty() {
@@ -302,3 +532,57 @@ fn run_capture(program: &Path, args: &[String]) -> Result<Captured> {
         stderr: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).to_string(),
     })
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io::Write;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn invalid_zip_is_rejected_before_accept() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let zip_path = dir.path().join("bad.zip");
+        fs::write(&zip_path, b"not a zip").unwrap();
+
+        let err = validate_drop_inputs(&zip_path).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("read zip"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn quarantine_moves_package_sidecars_and_writes_reason() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let drop = dir.path().join("drop");
+        let quarantine = dir.path().join("quarantine");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&drop).unwrap();
+        let zip_path = drop.join("HOST-20260624.zip");
+        fs::write(&zip_path, b"bad").unwrap();
+        fs::write(drop.join("HOST-20260624.meta.json"), b"{bad").unwrap();
+        fs::write(drop.join("HOST-20260624.caseid"), b"30").unwrap();
+
+        let err = anyhow::anyhow!("bad zip");
+        let target = quarantine_drop_package(&quarantine, &zip_path, &err).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(!zip_path.exists());
+        assert!(target.join("HOST-20260624.zip").is_file());
+        assert!(target.join("HOST-20260624.meta.json").is_file());
+        assert!(target.join("HOST-20260624.caseid").is_file());
+        let reason = fs::read_to_string(target.join("reason.json")).unwrap();
+        assert!(reason.contains("bad zip"));
+        assert!(reason.contains("aw-hayabusa-autoprocess-rust"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn valid_zip_with_backslash_entry_is_accepted_by_precheck() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let zip_path = dir.path().join("ok.zip");
+        let file = File::create(&zip_path).unwrap();
+        let mut zip = zip::ZipWriter::new(file);
+        let options = zip::write::SimpleFileOptions::default()
+            .compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated);
+        zip.start_file("evtx\\sample.evtx", options).unwrap();
+        zip.write_all(b"evtx").unwrap();
+        zip.finish().unwrap();
+
+        validate_drop_inputs(&zip_path).unwrap();
+    }
+}

adk-rust/crates/security-finding-inbox/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[package]
+name = "security-finding-inbox"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+publish.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hayabusa-tools = { path = "../hayabusa-tools" }
+reqwest.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tempfile.workspace = true

aw-server/hayabusa/README.md

@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ Behavior:
 - optional `*.caseid` sidecar with the same basename triggers automatic bounded case linkage
 - processed `*.zip` is moved out of `drop/` into `report_dir/input-drop/` to avoid repeated re-trigger loops
 - sidecars are archived into `report_dir/input-sidecars/`
+- bad drop packages are rejected before `accept`, moved to
+  `/opt/hayabusa/quarantine/drop/<timestamp>_<package>/`, and recorded with a
+  `reason.json` file instead of blocking later packages
+- bad or partially extracted incoming packages are moved to
+  `/opt/hayabusa/quarantine/incoming/<timestamp>_<package>/`; `process-inbox`
+  continues with the remaining queue and does not trip systemd start-limit only
+  because of one poison archive
 
 ## Windows direct upload into the drop zone
 
@@ -118,4 +125,43 @@ Production scheduled task on `SHARKON2025`:
 
 Do not switch this task back to `SYSTEM` on the current RDP host: Task Scheduler starts `powershell.exe` under `SYSTEM`, but the process exits with `0xC0000142` before the upload script starts.
 
-Server-side processing accepts Windows zip packages with backslash path separators and UTF-8 BOM in sidecar JSON. `aw-hayabusa-autoprocess` processes the full incoming queue after accepting a drop package, so stale incoming files from an earlier failed run are drained before the latest intake is recorded.
+Server-side processing accepts Windows zip packages with backslash path
+separators and UTF-8 BOM in sidecar JSON. `aw-hayabusa-autoprocess` processes
+the full incoming queue after accepting a drop package, so stale incoming files
+from an earlier failed run are drained before the latest intake is recorded.
+
+Poison-package handling is fail-closed:
+
+- Rust `aw-hayabusa-autoprocess-rust` validates the zip and sidecars before
+  calling `aw-hayabusa accept`.
+- A corrupt/empty/unsafe drop package is quarantined with its `.meta.json`,
+  `.caseid`, optional checksum sidecar and `reason.json`.
+- `aw-hayabusa process-inbox` isolates a failed incoming package instead of
+  aborting the whole batch.
+- Operators replay only a fixed/re-exported package by moving it back to the
+  drop zone or incoming queue. Do not edit quarantined evidence in place.
+
+## Security Finding Inbox integration
+
+`aw-hayabusa-autoprocess-rust` can publish a normalized suspicious-workstation
+finding after a successful intake is written to `/opt/hayabusa/state/latest-intake.json`.
+
+Default is disabled to keep forensic processing independent from ClickHouse:
+
+```bash
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Enable after the ClickHouse schema and CLI are installed:
+
+```bash
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_ENABLED=true
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_BIN=/usr/local/bin/security-finding-inbox
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_MIN_SEVERITY=medium
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_REQUIRED=false
+```
+
+With `AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_REQUIRED=false`, a temporary ClickHouse/inbox
+failure is logged as warning and does not poison the Hayabusa backlog. Use
+`true` only when the operator wants inbox publication failure to become an
+operational failure for the drop service.

aw-server/hayabusa/aw-hayabusa.sh

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ HAYA_STAGING_DIR="${AW_HAYABUSA_STAGING_DIR:-${HAYA_ROOT}/inbox/staging}"
 HAYA_ARCHIVE_PACKAGES_DIR="${AW_HAYABUSA_ARCHIVE_PACKAGES_DIR:-${HAYA_ROOT}/archive/packages}"
 HAYA_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTED_DIR="${AW_HAYABUSA_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTED_DIR:-${HAYA_ROOT}/archive/extracted}"
 HAYA_LOGS_DIR="${AW_HAYABUSA_LOGS_DIR:-${HAYA_ROOT}/state/logs}"
+HAYA_QUARANTINE_DIR="${AW_HAYABUSA_QUARANTINE_DIR:-${HAYA_ROOT}/quarantine/incoming}"
 LAST_REPORT_DIR=""
 
 usage() {
@@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ ensure_layout() {
     "${HAYA_INCOMING_DIR}" \
     "${HAYA_STAGING_DIR}" \
     "${HAYA_ARCHIVE_PACKAGES_DIR}" \
-    "${HAYA_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTED_DIR}"
+    "${HAYA_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTED_DIR}" \
+    "${HAYA_QUARANTINE_DIR}"
 }
 
 run_logged() {
@@ -405,7 +407,8 @@ process_one_package() {
 
   package_sha256="$(sha256sum "${package_path}" | awk '{print $1}')"
   if ! extract_zip_normalized "${package_path}" "${stage_dir}"; then
-    fail "normalized zip extraction failed for ${package_path}"
+    echo "ERROR: normalized zip extraction failed for ${package_path}" >&2
+    return 1
   fi
 
   local manifest_path host evtx_root archive_pkg_dir archive_extract_dir status report_dir
@@ -453,7 +456,47 @@ process_one_package() {
   if [ -n "${report_dir}" ]; then
     echo "Report directory: ${report_dir}"
   fi
-  [ "${status}" = "ok" ] || fail "Package workflow ended with status=${status}; archived for inspection"
+  if [ "${status}" != "ok" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: Package workflow ended with status=${status}; archived for inspection" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+quarantine_incoming_package() {
+  local package_path="$1"
+  local reason="$2"
+  local ts package_name package_base safe_base target_dir stage_dir sha256
+  ts="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
+  package_name="$(basename "${package_path}")"
+  package_base="${package_name%.zip}"
+  safe_base="$(sanitize "${package_name}")"
+  [ -n "${safe_base}" ] || safe_base="package.zip"
+  target_dir="${HAYA_QUARANTINE_DIR}/${ts}_${safe_base}"
+  mkdir -p "${target_dir}"
+  sha256=""
+  if [ -f "${package_path}" ] && command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    sha256="$(sha256sum "${package_path}" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  fi
+  for candidate in "${package_path}" "${package_path}.sha256" "${package_path}.host"; do
+    if [ -e "${candidate}" ]; then
+      mv "${candidate}" "${target_dir}/"
+    fi
+  done
+  stage_dir="${HAYA_STAGING_DIR}/${package_base}"
+  if [ -d "${stage_dir}" ]; then
+    mv "${stage_dir}" "${target_dir}/staging-partial"
+  fi
+  cat >"${target_dir}/reason.json" <<EOF
+{
+  "quarantined_at": "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)",
+  "source": "aw-hayabusa process-inbox",
+  "original_path": "${package_path}",
+  "sha256": "${sha256}",
+  "reason": "${reason}",
+  "operator_action": "inspect source package, re-export EVTX archive if needed, then replay by moving a fixed package back to incoming or drop"
+}
+EOF
+  echo "Quarantined failed incoming package: ${target_dir}" >&2
 }
 
 process_inbox() {
@@ -482,15 +525,26 @@ process_inbox() {
   esac
   ensure_layout
 
-  local count=0 pkg
+  local count=0 failed=0 pkg
   while IFS= read -r pkg; do
-    process_one_package "${pkg}" "${mode}"
+    if process_one_package "${pkg}" "${mode}"; then
-    count=$((count + 1))
+      count=$((count + 1))
+    else
+      failed=$((failed + 1))
+      if [ -f "${pkg}" ]; then
+        quarantine_incoming_package "${pkg}" "process_one_package failed"
+      else
+        echo "Package failed after archive/move, see archive intake manifest for details: ${pkg}" >&2
+      fi
+    fi
     if [ "${limit}" -gt 0 ] && [ "${count}" -ge "${limit}" ]; then
       break
     fi
   done < <(find "${HAYA_INCOMING_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.zip' | sort)
   [ "${count}" -gt 0 ] || echo "No packages in ${HAYA_INCOMING_DIR}"
+  if [ "${failed}" -gt 0 ]; then
+    echo "process-inbox completed with quarantined_or_archived_failures=${failed}" >&2
+  fi
 }
 
 main() {

clickhouse-1c/README.md

@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ File 1C + reglog + host telemetry
 - `grafana/provisioning/dashboards/files/1c-telemetry-board.json` — telemetry dashboard по состоянию файловых баз, reglog growth, busy markers и host load.
 - `detections/build_entity_timeline.sql` — сборка единого timeline слоя.
 - `detections/open_cases_from_detections.sql` — шаблон открытия cases из detections.
+- `security/security_finding_inbox.sql` — schema Security Finding Inbox:
+  подозрительные станции, raw finding evidence, workflow/executor events и
+  latest-state view для DetMir Portal.
 - `ops/etl-cron.example` — legacy cron example; production использует
   `aw-1c-ingest.timer`.
 - `ops/retention-policy.md` — минимальная retention policy.

clickhouse-1c/docker-compose.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ services:
     ports:
       - "${CLICKHOUSE_PORT}:8123"
       - "${CLICKHOUSE_NATIVE_PORT}:9000"
+    healthcheck:
+      test:
+        [
+          "CMD-SHELL",
+          "clickhouse-client --host 127.0.0.1 --user \"$${CLICKHOUSE_USER}\" --password \"$${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}\" --database \"$${CLICKHOUSE_DB}\" --query 'SELECT 1' >/dev/null",
+        ]
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 10s
+      retries: 5
+      start_period: 30s
     volumes:
       - clickhouse_1c_data:/var/lib/clickhouse
       - ./clickhouse/init:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro

clickhouse-1c/ops/run_ingest_cycle.sh

@@ -76,6 +76,14 @@ docker exec -i "${CH_CONTAINER}" clickhouse-client \
   --database "${CLICKHOUSE_DB}" \
   < "${ROOT}/detections/open_cases_from_detections.sql"
 
+if [[ -f "${ROOT}/security/security_finding_inbox.sql" ]]; then
+  docker exec -i "${CH_CONTAINER}" clickhouse-client \
+    --user "${CLICKHOUSE_USER}" \
+    --password "${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}" \
+    --database "${CLICKHOUSE_DB}" \
+    < "${ROOT}/security/security_finding_inbox.sql"
+fi
+
 if [[ "${RUN_MANAGER_BRIEF_AFTER_INGEST}" == "1" ]]; then
   if ! "${ROOT}/ops/run_manager_brief.sh"; then
     echo "warning: manager brief refresh failed after ingest" >&2

clickhouse-1c/security/security_finding_inbox.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS analytics_1c.security_findings
+(
+    ts DateTime64(3, 'UTC'),
+    finding_id String,
+    host String,
+    user String,
+    ip String,
+    department LowCardinality(String),
+    state LowCardinality(String),
+    severity LowCardinality(String),
+    confidence LowCardinality(String),
+    score UInt16,
+    source LowCardinality(String),
+    rule_id String,
+    rule_title String,
+    summary String,
+    recommended_action LowCardinality(String),
+    management_channel_checked UInt8,
+    evidence_ref String,
+    raw_json String,
+    ingested_at DateTime64(3, 'UTC') DEFAULT now64(3)
+)
+ENGINE = MergeTree
+PARTITION BY toYYYYMM(ts)
+ORDER BY (state, severity, host, ts, finding_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS analytics_1c.security_finding_workflow_events
+(
+    ts DateTime64(3, 'UTC'),
+    finding_id String,
+    event_type LowCardinality(String),
+    status LowCardinality(String),
+    actor String,
+    comment String,
+    decision_status String,
+    rollback_plan_id String,
+    plan_id String,
+    evidence_json String
+)
+ENGINE = MergeTree
+PARTITION BY toYYYYMM(ts)
+ORDER BY (finding_id, ts, event_type);
+
+DROP VIEW IF EXISTS analytics_1c.security_finding_inbox;
+
+CREATE VIEW analytics_1c.security_finding_inbox AS
+SELECT
+    f.finding_id AS finding_id,
+    min(f.ts) AS first_seen,
+    max(f.ts) AS last_seen,
+    argMax(f.host, f.ingested_at) AS host,
+    argMax(f.user, f.ingested_at) AS user,
+    argMax(f.ip, f.ingested_at) AS ip,
+    argMax(f.department, f.ingested_at) AS department,
+    argMax(f.state, f.ingested_at) AS state,
+    argMax(f.severity, f.ingested_at) AS severity,
+    argMax(f.confidence, f.ingested_at) AS confidence,
+    argMax(f.score, f.ingested_at) AS score,
+    argMax(f.source, f.ingested_at) AS source,
+    argMax(f.rule_id, f.ingested_at) AS rule_id,
+    argMax(f.rule_title, f.ingested_at) AS rule_title,
+    argMax(f.summary, f.ingested_at) AS summary,
+    argMax(f.recommended_action, f.ingested_at) AS recommended_action,
+    argMax(f.management_channel_checked, f.ingested_at) AS management_channel_checked,
+    argMax(f.evidence_ref, f.ingested_at) AS evidence_ref,
+    argMax(f.raw_json, f.ingested_at) AS raw_json,
+    coalesce(nullIf(w.status, ''), 'new') AS workflow_status,
+    coalesce(nullIf(w.event_type, ''), 'created') AS last_workflow_event,
+    w.workflow_updated_at AS workflow_updated_at,
+    coalesce(w.actor, '') AS workflow_actor,
+    coalesce(w.decision_status, '') AS decision_status,
+    coalesce(w.rollback_plan_id, '') AS rollback_plan_id,
+    coalesce(w.plan_id, '') AS plan_id
+FROM analytics_1c.security_findings AS f
+LEFT JOIN
+(
+    SELECT
+        finding_id,
+        argMax(event_type, ts) AS event_type,
+        argMax(status, ts) AS status,
+        argMax(actor, ts) AS actor,
+        argMax(decision_status, ts) AS decision_status,
+        argMax(rollback_plan_id, ts) AS rollback_plan_id,
+        argMax(plan_id, ts) AS plan_id,
+        max(ts) AS workflow_updated_at
+    FROM analytics_1c.security_finding_workflow_events
+    GROUP BY finding_id
+) AS w USING finding_id
+GROUP BY
+    f.finding_id,
+    w.status,
+    w.event_type,
+    w.workflow_updated_at,
+    w.actor,
+    w.decision_status,
+    w.rollback_plan_id,
+    w.plan_id;

configs/containment-finding.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "host": "HOST-EXAMPLE",
+  "host_role": "workstation",
+  "state": "suspected_infected",
+  "confidence": "high",
+  "signals": [
+    {
+      "source": "hayabusa",
+      "rule_id": "sigma-placeholder-critical",
+      "confidence": "critical"
+    },
+    {
+      "source": "velociraptor",
+      "rule_id": "Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring",
+      "confidence": "high"
+    }
+  ],
+  "recommended_action": "windows_firewall_quarantine",
+  "management_channel_checked": true,
+  "manual_operator_flag": false
+}

configs/containment-policy.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "enabled": false,
+  "mode": "shadow",
+  "default_ttl_minutes": 60,
+  "require_admin_channel_check": true,
+  "allow_auto_for_servers": false,
+  "allowed_actions": [
+    "windows_firewall_quarantine",
+    "pfsense_host_block"
+  ],
+  "management_allowlist": [
+    "aw_server",
+    "velociraptor_server",
+    "admin_jump_host"
+  ],
+  "minimum_high_signals_for_auto": 2
+}

configs/security/security-finding.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "ts": "2026-06-25T10:00:00Z",
+  "host": "HOST-EXAMPLE",
+  "user": "user-example",
+  "ip": "10.10.20.42",
+  "department": "demo",
+  "state": "suspected_infected",
+  "severity": "critical",
+  "confidence": "high",
+  "score": 95,
+  "source": "hayabusa",
+  "rule_id": "demo-sigma-critical",
+  "rule_title": "Demo high-confidence suspicious workstation",
+  "summary": "Demo finding for Security Finding Inbox validation.",
+  "recommended_action": "windows_firewall_quarantine",
+  "management_channel_checked": true,
+  "evidence_ref": "demo://hayabusa/HOST-EXAMPLE/demo-sigma-critical",
+  "metadata": {
+    "sample": "true"
+  }
+}

configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "target_host": "HOST-EXAMPLE",
+  "plan_id": "rollback-host-example-001",
+  "ttl_minutes": 60,
+  "reason": "High-confidence Hayabusa and Velociraptor containment drill",
+  "management_allowlist": [
+    "10.10.10.10",
+    "10.10.10.11",
+    "10.10.10.12"
+  ],
+  "blocked_remote_addresses": [
+    "10.10.20.0/24",
+    "10.10.30.0/24"
+  ],
+  "profiles": [
+    "Domain"
+  ]
+}

docs/CONTAINMENT_OPERATOR_RUNBOOK_RU.md

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# AWatch-rus containment operator runbook
+
+Дата: 2026-06-25.
+
+Runbook для безопасной проверки containment-логики. Текущая реализация не
+блокирует рабочие станции и не меняет сеть. Она только рассчитывает решение и
+показывает, был бы quarantine рекомендован или отказан.
+
+## 1. Сборка
+
+```bash
+cd /mnt/usb_hdd2/Projects/ActivityWatch-Russian
+export CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/igor/.cache/detmir-adk-rust-target
+cargo build --manifest-path adk-rust/Cargo.toml -p containment-engine
+```
+
+## 2. Smoke в disabled/shadow режиме
+
+```bash
+cd /mnt/usb_hdd2/Projects/ActivityWatch-Russian
+bash scripts/containment_shadow_smoke.sh
+```
+
+Ожидаемо:
+
+- JSON содержит `would_mutate=false`;
+- `decision_status=disabled` для default example policy;
+- нет изменений firewall, pfSense, AD, VLAN, routes.
+
+## 3. Проверка shadow recommendation
+
+Создайте временный policy с:
+
+```json
+{
+  "enabled": true,
+  "mode": "shadow"
+}
+```
+
+на базе `configs/containment-policy.example.json`, затем выполните:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine decide \
+  --policy /tmp/containment-policy-shadow.json \
+  --finding configs/containment-finding.example.json \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+Ожидаемо:
+
+- `decision_status=shadow_recommended`;
+- `would_mutate=false`;
+- `rollback_plan_id` заполнен;
+- `blockers=[]`.
+
+## 4. Manual approval mode
+
+`manual_approval` должен только поставить решение в состояние
+`manual_approval_required`. Он не применяет block сам.
+
+## 5. Auto mode
+
+В текущей реализации `auto` может вернуть `auto_ready`, но `would_mutate=false`.
+Это намеренно: decision layer сам не применяет блокировки.
+
+Запрещено считать `auto_ready` фактической блокировкой. Это только решение
+control plane.
+
+## 6. Windows Firewall executor dry-run
+
+Security Finding Inbox показывает подозрительные станции и фиксирует workflow
+события. Портал не выполняет firewall apply. После `approved` и
+`apply_requested` отдельный процесс `security-finding-inbox executor` может
+выполнить контролируемый цикл `decide -> plan -> apply -> verify`, а при
+ошибке `rollback`. По умолчанию executor работает dry-run/fail-closed.
+
+Сгенерируйте план:
+
+```bash
+cd /mnt/usb_hdd2/Projects/ActivityWatch-Russian
+containment-engine windows-firewall plan \
+  --request configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json \
+  --pretty > /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json
+```
+
+Проверьте `blockers`. Для корректного example они должны быть пустыми.
+
+Dry-run apply:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall apply \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --confirm-apply YES \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+Ожидаемо:
+
+- `execution_status=dry_run_commands_ready`;
+- `would_mutate=false`;
+- в JSON есть PowerShell-команды `New-NetFirewallRule`;
+- реальные firewall-правила не создаются.
+
+Verify dry-run:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall verify \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+Rollback dry-run:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall rollback \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --confirm-rollback YES \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+## 7. Real Windows execution rules
+
+Dry-run polling из центрального контура:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox executor \
+  --once \
+  --dry-run \
+  --containment-engine-bin /usr/local/bin/containment-engine \
+  --policy /etc/activitywatch/containment-policy.json \
+  --management-allowlist 10.10.10.10,10.10.10.11 \
+  --blocked-remote-addresses 10.10.20.0/24,10.10.30.0/24
+```
+
+Реальный Windows Firewall apply допускается только на целевой Windows-станции:
+
+```powershell
+security-finding-inbox.exe executor `
+  --once `
+  --execute-local `
+  --confirm-execute YES `
+  --executor-host HOST-EXAMPLE `
+  --containment-engine-bin C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\containment-engine.exe `
+  --policy C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\containment-policy.json `
+  --management-allowlist 10.10.10.10,10.10.10.11 `
+  --blocked-remote-addresses 10.10.20.0/24,10.10.30.0/24
+```
+
+Executor откажется, если нет `approved` перед `apply_requested`, finding не
+`suspected_infected`/`confirmed_infected`, management channel не проверен,
+allowlist/block ranges пустые, host finding не совпадает с executor host для
+local apply, containment policy возвращает blocker или Windows Firewall plan
+содержит blockers.
+
+`--execute-local` разрешён только для отдельного lab Windows host, где заранее
+проверены:
+
+- доступ с admin jump host;
+- доступ к AWatch/Velociraptor management адресам;
+- rollback command;
+- out-of-band доступ, если firewall rule ошибочен;
+- TTL и оператор, ответственный за возврат.
+
+Не использовать широкие блокировки `Any`/`LocalSubnet`: Windows Firewall
+block-правила могут перекрыть allow-правила и отрезать управление.
+
+## 8. Когда можно расширять real containment executor
+
+Только после выполнения условий:
+
+- есть lab host;
+- подтвержден management allowlist;
+- есть rollback command;
+- есть TTL rollback;
+- есть audit log;
+- `plan`, `apply`, `verify`, `rollback` покрыты тестами;
+- auto-containment для серверов остается disabled.
+
+## 9. Проверки перед commit
+
+```bash
+cd /mnt/usb_hdd2/Projects/ActivityWatch-Russian
+python3 scripts/public_secret_pattern_check.py
+bash -n scripts/containment_shadow_smoke.sh
+bash scripts/containment_shadow_smoke.sh
+git diff --check
+
+cd adk-rust
+export CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/igor/.cache/detmir-adk-rust-target
+cargo fmt --all --check
+cargo test -p containment-engine
+cargo clippy -p containment-engine --all-targets -- -D warnings
+```

docs/CONTAINMENT_POLICY_RU.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# AWatch-rus containment policy
+
+Дата: 2026-06-25.
+
+Этот документ описывает безопасную политику автоматической/полуавтоматической
+изоляции рабочих станций. Containment нужен для быстрого ограничения
+распространения заражения, но не является автоматическим лечением,
+remediation, EDR/XDR или сертифицированной СЗИ.
+
+## Default posture
+
+По умолчанию containment выключен:
+
+```text
+AW_CONTAINMENT_ENABLED=false
+AW_CONTAINMENT_MODE=shadow
+```
+
+`shadow` означает: система рассчитывает рекомендацию и audit, но не меняет
+firewall, pfSense, AD, VLAN, маршруты или состояние рабочих станций.
+
+## Policy file
+
+Default path:
+
+```text
+/etc/activitywatch/containment-policy.json
+```
+
+Repo example:
+
+```text
+configs/containment-policy.example.json
+```
+
+Критичные поля:
+
+- `enabled`: глобальный opt-in;
+- `mode`: `shadow`, `manual_approval`, `auto`;
+- `default_ttl_minutes`: срок quarantine до rollback/review;
+- `require_admin_channel_check`: запрещает блокировку, если управляемый канал
+  не проверен;
+- `allow_auto_for_servers`: по умолчанию `false`;
+- `allowed_actions`: whitelist containment-действий;
+- `management_allowlist`: каналы, которые должны оставаться доступными;
+- `minimum_high_signals_for_auto`: минимальный порог high/critical signals.
+
+## Safety rules
+
+- Не включать `auto` до успешного shadow burn-in.
+- Не включать auto-containment для серверов и domain controllers.
+- Не запускать containment без rollback record.
+- Не запускать containment, если будет потерян admin/management channel.
+- Не применять широкие AD/OU/domain actions.
+- Не удалять файлы, registry keys или процессы как часть containment.
+- Не заявлять, что containment гарантированно остановил заражение.
+
+## Decision threshold
+
+Automatic quarantine допускается только если:
+
+- host role is `workstation`;
+- host не входит в critical infrastructure denylist;
+- есть один `critical` signal или несколько `high` signals;
+- management-channel precheck passed;
+- action есть в `allowed_actions`;
+- rollback record создан успешно.
+
+## Security Finding Inbox handoff
+
+Security Finding Inbox (`docs/SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_RU.md`) является входной
+очередью для подозрительных рабочих станций. Он хранит findings и workflow
+events в ClickHouse, показывает их в DetMir Portal. Портал не выполняет
+containment самостоятельно.
+
+Workflow `apply_requested` означает только операторский запрос на применение.
+Фактическое применение идет через отдельный процесс
+`security-finding-inbox executor`, который повторно проверяет `approved`,
+запускает `containment-engine decide`, строит Windows Firewall plan, затем
+выполняет `apply`, `verify` и при ошибке `rollback`. Реальная мутация firewall
+разрешена только на целевой Windows-станции при `--execute-local`,
+`--confirm-execute YES` и совпадении `--executor-host` с finding host.
+
+## Current implementation status
+
+Реализован первый безопасный слой:
+
+- Rust CLI `containment-engine`;
+- strict JSON policy/finding parsing;
+- `disabled`, `shadow`, `manual_approval`, `auto` decision states;
+- server/unknown host roles refused for auto mode by default;
+- `would_mutate=false` for current implementation;
+- separate Windows Firewall executor interface:
+  `plan`, `apply`, `verify`, `rollback`;
+- Windows Firewall executor defaults to dry-run command generation unless
+  `--execute-local` and explicit confirmation are used.
+
+pfSense/AD/VLAN mutation paths are not implemented.
+
+## Windows Firewall executor
+
+Executor input example:
+
+```text
+configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json
+```
+
+The executor is deliberately separate from decision making:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall plan \
+  --request configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json \
+  --pretty > /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json
+
+containment-engine windows-firewall apply \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --confirm-apply YES \
+  --pretty
+
+containment-engine windows-firewall verify \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --pretty
+
+containment-engine windows-firewall rollback \
+  --plan /tmp/windows-firewall-plan.json \
+  --confirm-rollback YES \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+Without `--execute-local`, `apply` and `rollback` return generated PowerShell
+commands and `would_mutate=false`.
+
+With `--execute-local`, execution is allowed only on a Windows host and only
+after explicit confirmation. On non-Windows hosts the executor fails closed.
+
+## Windows Firewall guardrails
+
+- `management_allowlist` is mandatory.
+- `blocked_remote_addresses` must be explicit IPs/subnets.
+- Broad block targets such as `Any`, `*`, `LocalSubnet`, `Internet`,
+  `Intranet` are refused.
+- The executor does not change Windows Firewall profile defaults.
+- The executor does not disable interfaces, routes, users, services or
+  processes.
+- Every plan includes rollback through `Remove-NetFirewallRule -Group ...`.
+- A successful dry-run is not evidence that the workstation has been isolated.

docs/LOW_COST_SIGMA_HAYABUSA_VELOCIRAPTOR_ADDON_RU.md

@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+# Low-cost Sigma/Hayabusa/Velociraptor containment addon
+
+Дата: 2026-06-25.
+
+Цель: добавить в AWatch-rus дешевый, воспроизводимый и отключаемый слой
+security containment + forensics для организаций без зрелого SIEM/EDR. Главный
+смысл модуля - быстро ограничить дальнейшее распространение заражения или
+подозрительной активности с рабочей станции, сохранив управляемый канал
+расследования и восстановления.
+
+Это дополнение не делает AWatch-rus сертифицированной DLP/SIEM/EDR/XDR/СЗИ и
+не заменяет штатные средства защиты. Автоматическая блокировка здесь означает
+policy-approved containment/quarantine, а не автоматическое лечение системы.
+
+## Upstream basis
+
+- Hayabusa: fast Windows event log forensics timeline generator and threat
+  hunting tool, written in Rust, using Sigma-compatible Hayabusa rules.
+- Hayabusa supports single-host/live analysis, offline analysis of collected
+  logs, and enterprise-wide use through a Velociraptor artifact.
+- Hayabusa outputs timeline/results suitable for CSV, JSON/JSONL and HTML
+  reports.
+- `Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring` in Velociraptor Curated Sigma is an artifact
+  intended to triage a Windows host and is based on `Windows.Sigma.BaseEvents`.
+- Velociraptor is an endpoint visibility and collection tool using VQL
+  artifacts. Its normal deployment is server + clients, but it also supports
+  offline collectors and command-line artifact execution.
+
+Primary references:
+
+- https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa
+- https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/wiki/About-Hayabusa
+- https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules
+- https://sigma.velocidex.com/docs/artifacts/windows.hayabusa.monitoring/
+- https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor
+- https://docs.velociraptor.app/docs/deployment/
+
+## Product positioning
+
+Рабочее название модуля:
+
+```text
+AWatch-rus Low-Cost Containment Pack
+```
+
+Назначение:
+
+- быстро получить полезный containment + DFIR/threat-hunting слой там, где
+  нет SIEM/EDR;
+- автоматически или полуавтоматически изолировать подозрительно зараженную
+  рабочую станцию от критичных сегментов;
+- сохранить минимальный управляемый канал: AWatch-rus/Velociraptor server,
+  администраторский jump/VPN, DNS/NTP при необходимости;
+- запускать Hayabusa/Sigma-анализ EVTX и Velociraptor artifact collection;
+- давать владельцу и администратору понятные findings, timeline и evidence;
+- связывать findings с AWatch-rus cases и operator/forensics views;
+- оставаться optional и выключаемым без деградации Workforce core.
+
+Запрещенные claims:
+
+- не писать, что это SIEM replacement;
+- не писать, что это DLP replacement;
+- не писать, что это EDR/XDR;
+- не писать, что это сертифицированная СЗИ;
+- не писать, что автоматическое remediation включено;
+- не писать, что automatic containment гарантированно остановит заражение;
+- не писать, что threat detection ML/LLM-based;
+- не писать, что найденные события являются доказанной атакой без ручной
+  проверки.
+
+Допустимая формулировка:
+
+```text
+Optional low-cost containment, security analytics and forensics layer based on
+open-source Hayabusa/Sigma/Velociraptor workflows.
+```
+
+## Containment objective
+
+Модуль должен отвечать на вопрос:
+
+```text
+Как максимально быстро ограничить рабочую станцию, которая выглядит зараженной,
+чтобы она не заражала соседние машины и не продолжала утечку/распространение?
+```
+
+Необходимо разделять:
+
+- `suspected_infected` - есть правила/сигналы/аномалии, достаточные для
+  карантина по политике организации;
+- `confirmed_infected` - есть ручное подтверждение администратора/ИБ;
+- `contained` - станция технически ограничена;
+- `released` - карантин снят вручную или по документированному rollback.
+
+Containment actions должны быть обратимыми, журналируемыми и ограниченными по
+blast radius. По умолчанию допускается `shadow` или `manual_approval`; fully
+automatic quarantine включается только отдельным флагом и только после
+allowlist/rollback проверки.
+
+## Architecture
+
+### Modes
+
+1. `disabled`
+   - default для conservative deployment;
+   - все readiness checks возвращают disabled-state;
+   - Workforce/ActivityWatch core не зависит от модуля.
+
+2. `hayabusa_offline`
+   - текущий базовый режим;
+   - Windows scheduled task экспортирует EVTX zip;
+   - серверный `aw-hayabusa-drop.path` принимает package;
+   - `aw-hayabusa-autoprocess` валидирует zip, process-inbox, quarantine.
+
+3. `velociraptor_offline_collector`
+   - для бедных/малых контуров без постоянно работающего Velociraptor server;
+   - AWatch-rus собирает/хранит signed offline collector bundle;
+   - запуск collector выполняется вручную или scheduled task;
+   - результаты импортируются как artifact bundle.
+
+4. `velociraptor_server_clients`
+   - optional managed mode;
+   - Linux server рядом с AW/Proxmox или отдельной VM;
+   - Windows clients ставятся только явным Ansible-флагом;
+   - используется для управляемого запуска `Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring`.
+
+5. `containment_shadow`
+   - decision engine считает, что сделал бы, но ничего не блокирует;
+   - безопасный default для пилота;
+   - используется для настройки правил и false-positive анализа.
+
+6. `containment_manual_approval`
+   - система формирует containment recommendation;
+   - администратор подтверждает действие в CLI/портале;
+   - все действия пишутся в audit trail.
+
+7. `containment_auto`
+   - система сама применяет заранее разрешенные quarantine-действия;
+   - включается только явным флагом;
+   - требует allowlist, rollback TTL и проверку сохранения admin channel.
+
+### Boundaries
+
+Core remains:
+
+- ActivityWatch server;
+- Workforce reports;
+- RDP/window/AFK/worktime collectors;
+- 1C/ClickHouse analytics;
+- portal health/readiness;
+- Hayabusa drop quarantine hardening.
+
+Optional containment/forensics layer:
+
+- Hayabusa binary and rules;
+- Sigma/Hayabusa curated rules cache;
+- Velociraptor binary/config/artifacts;
+- Velociraptor clients/offline collectors;
+- artifact result import;
+- findings summary and case links;
+- containment decision engine;
+- containment executor for approved channels.
+
+Containment channels:
+
+- Windows host firewall quarantine:
+  allow only AWatch-rus/Velociraptor server, DNS/NTP if required, and admin
+  jump/VPN;
+- pfSense/network gateway block:
+  block workstation IP/MAC from lateral/internal segments, keep management
+  exception;
+- switch/VLAN quarantine when supported:
+  move port/client to quarantine VLAN through explicit integration;
+- Windows local containment:
+  stop risky shares/services, disable outbound SMB/RDP to peers, collect
+  evidence;
+- Active Directory actions, if configured:
+  disable only the workstation account or user session by policy, never broad
+  OU/domain actions by default.
+
+Non-goals:
+
+- deleting malware;
+- cleaning registry/files;
+- killing arbitrary processes based on weak signal;
+- disabling domain-wide accounts;
+- blocking servers/shared infrastructure automatically;
+- hiding the host from administrators.
+
+No hot-path dependency:
+
+- portal first screen must not wait for Velociraptor;
+- Workforce reports must not query Velociraptor;
+- readiness must not fail when module is disabled;
+- heavy artifact execution must be timer/manual/background only.
+
+## Proposed configuration
+
+Ansible group vars:
+
+```yaml
+aw_forensics_pack_enabled: false
+aw_hayabusa_enabled: true
+aw_hayabusa_rules_enabled: true
+aw_hayabusa_rules_version: "pinned"
+aw_hayabusa_rules_update_enabled: false
+
+aw_velociraptor_enabled: false
+aw_velociraptor_mode: "disabled" # disabled|offline_collector|server_clients
+aw_velociraptor_version: "pinned"
+aw_velociraptor_server_bind_host: "127.0.0.1"
+aw_velociraptor_public_enabled: false
+aw_velociraptor_artifact_pack_enabled: true
+aw_velociraptor_hayabusa_artifact_enabled: true
+
+aw_forensics_store_raw_artifacts: false
+aw_forensics_raw_retention_days: 7
+aw_forensics_result_retention_days: 90
+aw_forensics_max_parallel_jobs: 1
+aw_forensics_max_job_minutes: 30
+aw_forensics_cpu_quota_pct: 25
+aw_forensics_io_nice: true
+
+aw_containment_enabled: false
+aw_containment_mode: "shadow" # shadow|manual_approval|auto
+aw_containment_default_ttl_minutes: 60
+aw_containment_require_admin_channel_check: true
+aw_containment_allow_auto_for_servers: false
+aw_containment_allowed_actions:
+  - windows_firewall_quarantine
+  - pfsense_host_block
+aw_containment_management_allowlist:
+  - "aw_server"
+  - "velociraptor_server"
+  - "admin_jump_host"
+```
+
+Runtime env:
+
+```text
+AW_FORENSICS_PACK_ENABLED=false
+AW_HAYABUSA_ENABLED=true
+AW_VELOCIRAPTOR_ENABLED=false
+AW_VELOCIRAPTOR_MODE=disabled
+AW_FORENSICS_STORE_RAW_ARTIFACTS=false
+AW_CONTAINMENT_ENABLED=false
+AW_CONTAINMENT_MODE=shadow
+```
+
+## Data flow
+
+### Existing Hayabusa path
+
+```text
+Windows EVTX export
+  -> zip + sidecars
+  -> /opt/activitywatch/aw-rus-ops/drop
+  -> aw-hayabusa-autoprocess
+  -> validate package
+  -> accept/process-inbox
+  -> result_dir/latest-intake.json
+  -> case link / portal summary
+  -> quarantine on bad package
+```
+
+### New Velociraptor path
+
+```text
+Velociraptor artifact run
+  -> Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring / custom artifact
+  -> Velociraptor result export
+  -> AWatch-rus import directory
+  -> schema validation
+  -> derived findings JSON/SQLite
+  -> optional case link
+  -> portal forensics summary
+```
+
+### Containment path
+
+```text
+Finding/signals
+  -> confidence and policy evaluation
+  -> containment decision record
+  -> admin-channel precheck
+  -> shadow/manual/auto execution
+  -> verify containment
+  -> case/audit record
+  -> TTL/rollback queue
+```
+
+Raw artifacts and derived results must be separated:
+
+- raw EVTX/result bundles: restricted evidence storage;
+- derived findings: sanitized AWatch-rus views;
+- operator notes/case links: case database;
+- public/demo exports: no raw hostnames, users, IPs, paths or secrets.
+
+## Security and privacy guardrails
+
+- Store no secrets in repo, docs, demo data or screenshots.
+- Do not commit generated Velociraptor config with private keys/client secrets.
+- Do not expose Velociraptor GUI publicly by default.
+- Default server bind should be loopback or private VPN-only address.
+- Require explicit operator action for client deployment.
+- Require retention policy for raw artifacts.
+- Require redaction for export/demo packs.
+- Require audit log for artifact imports, deletes and case links.
+- Treat Velociraptor outputs as untrusted input: validate schema, size, paths
+  and timestamps before import.
+- Never execute arbitrary downloaded artifacts without pinning/checksums.
+- Never run containment if management channel would be lost.
+- Never auto-contain servers unless explicitly allowed and tested.
+- Always create rollback record before applying a block.
+- Always include TTL or manual release path.
+- Always log who/what triggered containment, which signals were used and which
+  network paths remain allowed.
+
+## Containment decision model
+
+Inputs:
+
+- high/critical Hayabusa/Sigma rule hits;
+- suspicious Windows event sequence from Velociraptor artifact;
+- AWatch-rus endpoint signals such as mass file changes, unusual process/file
+  behavior, DLP/security signal spikes;
+- administrator manual flag.
+
+Decision fields:
+
+```json
+{
+  "host": "HOST",
+  "host_role": "workstation",
+  "state": "suspected_infected",
+  "confidence": "medium|high|critical",
+  "signals": ["hayabusa:rule-id", "velociraptor:artifact"],
+  "recommended_action": "windows_firewall_quarantine",
+  "mode": "shadow|manual_approval|auto",
+  "ttl_minutes": 60,
+  "management_channel_checked": true,
+  "rollback_plan_id": "opaque-id"
+}
+```
+
+Minimum threshold for automatic quarantine:
+
+- host role is workstation;
+- host is not in denylist of critical infrastructure;
+- at least one critical signal or multiple high-confidence signals;
+- management channel precheck passed;
+- containment action is in allowlist;
+- rollback record successfully written.
+
+## Current implementation status
+
+Implemented first safe layer:
+
+- Rust CLI `containment-engine`;
+- strict JSON parsing for policy/finding input;
+- example files:
+  `configs/containment-policy.example.json`,
+  `configs/containment-finding.example.json`,
+  `configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json`;
+- disabled-by-default Ansible/env configuration;
+- `shadow`, `manual_approval` and `auto` decision states;
+- automatic containment refused for non-workstation roles by default;
+- `would_mutate=false` in current implementation;
+- Windows Firewall executor interface:
+  `plan`, `apply`, `verify`, `rollback`;
+- Windows Firewall dry-run generates PowerShell `New-NetFirewallRule`,
+  `Get-NetFirewallRule` and `Remove-NetFirewallRule` commands;
+- Windows Firewall execution is fail-closed without explicit confirmation and
+  `--execute-local`;
+- Security Finding Inbox:
+  ClickHouse schema, Rust ingest CLI, Hayabusa/Velociraptor source adapters,
+  portal page `Подозрительные станции` and separate executor process for
+  approved `apply_requested` workflow;
+- smoke script:
+  `bash scripts/containment_shadow_smoke.sh`;
+- operator/policy docs:
+  `docs/CONTAINMENT_OPERATOR_RUNBOOK_RU.md`,
+  `docs/CONTAINMENT_POLICY_RU.md`.
+
+Not implemented yet:
+
+- production-verified Windows Firewall mutation on lab/real workstations;
+- real pfSense alias/table mutation;
+- AD/VLAN executor;
+- TTL rollback service;
+- portal containment action execution. The current portal records workflow
+  events only and does not mutate firewall/network state; mutation is reserved
+  for `security-finding-inbox executor` with explicit local Windows
+  confirmation.
+
+## Codex implementation plan
+
+### Phase 0. Architecture and docs only
+
+Files:
+
+- `docs/LOW_COST_SIGMA_HAYABUSA_VELOCIRAPTOR_ADDON_RU.md`;
+- `docs/PROJECT_STATUS_RU.md`;
+- `docs/REGISTRY_FUNCTIONAL_SCOPE_RU.md`;
+- `README.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- record addon scope and non-goals;
+- document upstream references and license/supply-chain review requirement;
+- state that module is planned/optional until implemented;
+- keep forbidden SIEM/DLP/СЗИ claims blocked.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- docs mention optional low-cost containment/forensics layer;
+- no runtime/API/UI/product code change;
+- secret scan and diff check pass.
+
+### Phase 1. Inventory current Hayabusa implementation
+
+Files:
+
+- `aw-server/hayabusa/README.md`;
+- `aw-server/hayabusa/aw-hayabusa.sh`;
+- `adk-rust/crates/hayabusa-tools/`;
+- `windows/export-evtx-for-hayabusa.ps1`;
+- `windows/export-upload-hayabusa-to-aw-server.ps1`;
+- `ansible/deploy_aw_server.yml`;
+- `ansible/deploy_aw_windows.yml`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- document installed binaries, units, timers, directories and retention;
+- verify current drop/inbox/quarantine behavior;
+- add a manifest file for current Hayabusa server bundle;
+- add a read-only status command if missing.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- `aw-hayabusa doctor` remains green;
+- bad zip quarantine behavior remains intact;
+- no change to DLP disabled runtime state.
+
+### Phase 2. Supply-chain manifest and pinned downloads
+
+New files:
+
+- `third_party/forensics/manifest.json`;
+- `scripts/prepare_forensics_binaries.sh`;
+- `docs/FORENSICS_SUPPLY_CHAIN_RU.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- define pinned versions for Hayabusa, Hayabusa rules and Velociraptor;
+- define SHA256 checksums and source URLs;
+- support offline cache directory;
+- fail closed if checksum mismatch;
+- never auto-update rules in production unless explicitly enabled.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- dry-run prints planned downloads only;
+- checksum verification works on cached fixture;
+- no network required for deploy when cache exists.
+
+### Phase 3. Optional Velociraptor server install
+
+New/changed files:
+
+- `ansible/group_vars/all.yml`;
+- `ansible/group_vars/all.example.yml`;
+- `ansible/deploy_aw_server.yml`;
+- `ops/systemd/velociraptor.service`;
+- `docs/VELOCIRAPTOR_DEPLOYMENT_RU.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- add `aw_velociraptor_enabled=false` default;
+- install Velociraptor binary only when enabled;
+- generate config only on target host, not in repo;
+- bind to loopback/private address by default;
+- store datastore under `/var/lib/velociraptor`;
+- store config under `/etc/velociraptor`;
+- add systemd service with resource limits;
+- avoid public exposure unless explicitly configured.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- disabled mode creates no running service;
+- enabled mode installs service and returns local health;
+- generated config is not committed;
+- Ansible syntax check passes.
+
+### Phase 4. Velociraptor client/offline collector packaging
+
+Files:
+
+- `ansible/deploy_aw_windows.yml`;
+- `windows/ActivityWatch.Windows.Common.psm1`;
+- `windows/validate-deployment.ps1`;
+- optional `windows/install-velociraptor-client.ps1`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- add explicit deployment mode:
+  `disabled|offline_collector|client_service`;
+- package client installer/offline collector from pinned binary/config;
+- install client service only when explicitly enabled;
+- keep scheduled/manual offline collector for low-cost mode;
+- log to `C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\logs\velociraptor-*.log`;
+- include service/task checks in validation only when enabled.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- disabled mode leaves Windows host untouched;
+- offline collector can run and produce an export bundle;
+- service mode reports healthy enrollment without exposing credentials.
+
+### Phase 5. Hayabusa/Sigma artifact integration
+
+Files:
+
+- `third_party/forensics/artifacts/`;
+- `scripts/import_velociraptor_artifact_pack.sh`;
+- `docs/HAYABUSA_SIGMA_RULES_RU.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- import/prepare `Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring` artifact pack;
+- document mapping to Hayabusa rules;
+- create curated profile:
+  `low-cost-default`, `incident`, `full`;
+- add noisy-rule tuning file;
+- require version metadata in every run.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- artifact pack import is reproducible;
+- rules profile can be listed without running collection;
+- config supports small-host low-resource default.
+
+### Phase 6. AWatch-rus result import
+
+Prefer Rust.
+
+New crate or extension:
+
+- `adk-rust/crates/forensics-importer`;
+  or extend `adk-rust/crates/hayabusa-tools`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- import Hayabusa JSON/JSONL/CSV summary;
+- import Velociraptor artifact result export;
+- normalize to derived finding schema:
+  `source`, `host`, `time`, `rule`, `level`, `mitre`, `summary`,
+  `evidence_ref`, `case_id`, `tool_version`, `rules_version`;
+- reject oversized, malformed and path-traversal payloads;
+- write derived SQLite/JSON under `/var/lib/activitywatch/forensics`;
+- do not copy raw artifacts unless `AW_FORENSICS_STORE_RAW_ARTIFACTS=true`.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- unit tests cover malformed JSON, oversized file, path traversal, empty result;
+- fixture import produces stable output;
+- raw-sensitive data is not rendered in default portal view.
+
+### Phase 7. Containment control plane
+
+Prefer Rust.
+
+New crate or extension:
+
+- `adk-rust/crates/containment-engine`;
+  or extend `adk-rust/crates/forensics-importer` with a separate module.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- define containment decision schema and audit log;
+- add policy file:
+  `/etc/activitywatch/containment-policy.json`;
+- add host role model:
+  `workstation|server|domain_controller|unknown`;
+- add safe defaults:
+  `enabled=false`, `mode=shadow`, server auto-containment disabled;
+- implement decision evaluation from imported findings;
+- implement dry-run/shadow output;
+- implement manual approval queue;
+- implement rollback record format.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- unit tests cover workstation/server/unknown host roles;
+- automatic action is refused for server/unknown role by default;
+- no action runs if management channel precheck fails;
+- shadow mode produces audit record and does not mutate host/network.
+
+### Phase 8. Containment executors
+
+Executor targets:
+
+- Windows firewall quarantine through PowerShell/Rust Windows helper;
+- pfSense alias/table block through explicit API/SSH integration;
+- optional switch/VLAN integration only behind feature flag.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- implement executor interface:
+  `plan`, `apply`, `verify`, `rollback`;
+- first implemented executor: Windows Firewall explicit management allowlist
+  plus explicit block ranges, without broad `Any`/`LocalSubnet` block and
+  without default firewall profile changes;
+- apply pfSense host block using IP/MAC only after current lease/identity
+  verification;
+- store rollback before mutation;
+- add TTL-based rollback timer;
+- add emergency release command.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- fixture mode shows exact firewall/pfSense plan;
+- apply refuses empty allowlist;
+- verify confirms blocked lateral path and allowed management path;
+- rollback restores previous rules;
+- logs contain no secrets.
+
+### Phase 9. Portal and API integration
+
+Files:
+
+- `adk-rust/crates/detmir-portal/`;
+- `docs/PORTAL_API_CONTRACTS_RU.md`;
+- `docs/DETMIR_CURRENT_STATE_RU.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- add optional forensics module state:
+  `disabled|not_configured|ready|degraded`;
+- show derived findings count, latest run, severity histogram;
+- show containment state:
+  `disabled|shadow|recommended|contained|rollback_pending|released`;
+- show clear action buttons only for authorized admin/security roles;
+- link to case/evidence only by opaque ID;
+- do not block Workforce first screen;
+- do not include raw artifacts in frontend payload.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- with module disabled, portal shows disabled-state and remains fast;
+- with fixture findings, portal renders summary;
+- with fixture containment recommendation, portal renders action state without
+  applying action;
+- Playwright smoke confirms no endless loading and no raw sensitive fields.
+
+### Phase 10. Health/readiness/checks
+
+Files:
+
+- `adk-rust/crates/detmir-check/`;
+- `adk-rust/crates/detmir-readiness/`;
+- `scripts/detmir-full-diagnostics/aw-contour-diag.sh`;
+- `scripts/aw-contour-diag.sh`;
+- `check-aw-full.sh`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- add optional forensics status checks;
+- disabled mode must be OK/Skipped, not fail;
+- add optional containment status checks;
+- enabled mode checks:
+  Velociraptor service, artifact pack, latest run age, importer health,
+  queue/quarantine counts, containment executor health;
+- add resource pressure checks for long-running scans.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- disabled mode produces `forensics:mode=disabled`;
+- disabled containment mode produces `containment:mode=disabled`;
+- enabled mode fails closed on stale/broken artifact importer;
+- containment auto mode fails closed if rollback store or admin-channel precheck
+  is unavailable;
+- checks do not restart services unless explicit autoheal mode exists.
+
+### Phase 11. Runtime safety and resource budgets
+
+Files:
+
+- systemd units/timers;
+- Ansible vars;
+- docs runbooks.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- enforce `Nice`, `IOSchedulingClass`, CPU quota and timeout for heavy scans;
+- serialize jobs through lock file;
+- add cancellation/timeout behavior;
+- quarantine failed artifact runs;
+- keep `aw-server-rust`, worktime API, ClickHouse and portal out of the scan
+  critical path.
+- enforce containment mutation lock so two block/unblock actions cannot race.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- two concurrent scan requests do not run two heavy jobs;
+- timeout leaves a clear failed run record;
+- core health remains green under disabled mode.
+- rollback timer is tested and idempotent.
+
+### Phase 12. Documentation and operator runbooks
+
+New docs:
+
+- `docs/VELOCIRAPTOR_DEPLOYMENT_RU.md`;
+- `docs/FORENSICS_SUPPLY_CHAIN_RU.md`;
+- `docs/FORENSICS_OPERATOR_RUNBOOK_RU.md`;
+- `docs/FORENSICS_RETENTION_POLICY_RU.md`;
+- `docs/FORENSICS_PRIVACY_GUARDRAILS_RU.md`.
+- `docs/CONTAINMENT_OPERATOR_RUNBOOK_RU.md`;
+- `docs/CONTAINMENT_POLICY_RU.md`.
+
+Tasks:
+
+- describe installation modes;
+- describe offline collector workflow;
+- describe artifact run, import, case link and cleanup;
+- describe forbidden data in screenshots/demo packs;
+- document rollback and disable commands.
+- describe quarantine policy, management allowlist, manual approval, emergency
+  release and TTL rollback.
+
+Acceptance:
+
+- admin can install disabled/offline/server modes from docs;
+- admin can test shadow containment safely before auto mode;
+- docs clearly say GitHub/public demo is not evidence storage;
+- no claim of SIEM/DLP/EDR/СЗИ replacement.
+
+### Phase 13. Tests and gates
+
+Required checks:
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/public_secret_pattern_check.py
+bash -n scripts/prepare_forensics_binaries.sh
+ansible-playbook -i ansible/inventory.ini ansible/deploy_aw_server.yml --syntax-check
+ansible-playbook -i ansible/inventory.ini ansible/deploy_aw_windows.yml --syntax-check
+
+cd adk-rust
+export CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/igor/.cache/detmir-adk-rust-target
+cargo fmt --all --check
+cargo test -p hayabusa-tools
+cargo test -p forensics-importer
+cargo test -p containment-engine
+cargo clippy -p hayabusa-tools -p forensics-importer -p containment-engine --all-targets -- -D warnings
+
+cd ..
+git diff --check
+```
+
+Manual/live checks:
+
+- disabled mode on clean install;
+- Hayabusa current drop-zone smoke;
+- Velociraptor offline collector fixture run;
+- Velociraptor server health if enabled;
+- containment shadow run with fixture critical finding;
+- manual approval containment in isolated lab host;
+- rollback verification;
+- portal browser smoke with module disabled and with fixture findings;
+- no public exposure of Velociraptor GUI unless explicitly configured.
+
+## Codex guardrails
+
+Codex must not:
+
+- change Workforce core behavior while adding this module;
+- re-enable heavy DLP runtime by accident;
+- expose Velociraptor or Hayabusa outputs publicly;
+- commit generated secrets, private configs or raw evidence;
+- auto-block hosts before policy, allowlist, rollback and admin-channel checks
+  exist;
+- auto-block servers/domain infrastructure by default;
+- claim completed integration before live/manual evidence exists;
+- change Rust/API/UI runtime outside the planned files without documenting why.
+
+Codex should:
+
+- start with docs/config disabled mode;
+- implement supply-chain pinning before service deployment;
+- prefer Rust for import/validation/parsing;
+- treat containment as a separate audited control plane, not as generic
+  remediation;
+- keep PowerShell only for Windows install/run wrappers;
+- add small fixtures and negative tests before live deployment;
+- update project status after each successfully verified phase.
+
+## Expected result
+
+After implementation AWatch-rus should have:
+
+- installed/pinned Hayabusa and rules workflow;
+- optional bundled Velociraptor server/client/offline collector modes;
+- reproducible artifact pack handling for `Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring`;
+- derived findings importer into AWatch-rus forensics views;
+- policy-controlled automated/manual quarantine of suspected infected
+  workstations;
+- rollback and emergency release path for every containment action;
+- disabled-by-default safety;
+- resource-bounded scans;
+- clear runbooks for poor/small organizations;
+- honest positioning as low-cost containment, security analytics and forensics, not
+  SIEM/DLP/EDR/СЗИ.

docs/SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_RU.md

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+# Security Finding Inbox
+
+Дата: 2026-06-25.
+
+Security Finding Inbox - это очередь подозрительных рабочих станций для
+связки Hayabusa/Sigma, Velociraptor, AWatch context и ручных ИБ-сигналов.
+Очередь нужна для контролируемого процесса:
+
+```text
+finding -> triage -> decide -> plan -> approve -> apply_requested -> executor -> verify/rollback
+```
+
+Важно: портал inbox сам не применяет Windows Firewall, pfSense, AD или VLAN
+изменения. Он фиксирует findings и workflow-события. Реальное применение
+делается отдельным процессом `security-finding-inbox executor`, который
+вызывает `containment-engine windows-firewall plan/apply/verify/rollback`.
+По умолчанию executor работает безопасно: dry-run/fail-closed, без локального
+изменения firewall.
+
+## Компоненты
+
+- ClickHouse schema:
+  `clickhouse-1c/security/security_finding_inbox.sql`
+- normalized finding example:
+  `configs/security/security-finding.example.json`
+- ingest/workflow CLI:
+  `adk-rust/crates/security-finding-inbox`
+- executor CLI:
+  `security-finding-inbox executor`
+- portal API:
+  `/api/security/findings`
+  `/api/security/findings/workflow`
+- portal page:
+  `Подозрительные станции`
+
+## ClickHouse tables
+
+`security_findings`
+
+- normalized finding records;
+- source: `hayabusa`, `sigma`, `velociraptor`, `awatch`, `manual`, `dlp`;
+- states: `new`, `suspected_infected`, `confirmed_infected`, `contained`,
+  `released`, `false_positive`;
+- recommended action remains a recommendation, not a mutation.
+
+`security_finding_workflow_events`
+
+- append-only workflow audit;
+- event types: `decide_requested`, `plan_requested`, `approved`,
+  `apply_requested`, `verify_requested`, `rollback_requested`, `rejected`,
+  `false_positive`, plus executor audit events:
+  `executor_plan_ready`, `executor_apply_succeeded`,
+  `executor_apply_failed`, `executor_verify_succeeded`,
+  `executor_verify_failed`, `executor_refused`,
+  `executor_rollback_succeeded`, `executor_rollback_failed`;
+- portal writes only workflow events.
+
+`security_finding_inbox`
+
+- latest-state view for portal/dashboard;
+- filters released/rejected/false-positive rows out of the active queue.
+
+## Ingest
+
+Build:
+
+```bash
+cd /mnt/usb_hdd2/Projects/ActivityWatch-Russian
+export CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/igor/.cache/detmir-adk-rust-target
+cargo build --manifest-path adk-rust/Cargo.toml -p security-finding-inbox
+```
+
+Validate sample:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox validate \
+  --input configs/security/security-finding.example.json
+```
+
+Dry-run ingest:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox ingest \
+  --input configs/security/security-finding.example.json \
+  --dry-run
+```
+
+Apply schema and ingest into ClickHouse:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox ingest \
+  --input configs/security/security-finding.example.json \
+  --clickhouse-url http://10.10.10.2:8123 \
+  --database analytics_1c \
+  --user "$CLICKHOUSE_USER" \
+  --password "$CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD" \
+  --apply-schema
+```
+
+The CLI accepts a single JSON object, JSON array, or JSONL.
+
+### Real Hayabusa source
+
+После `aw-hayabusa process-inbox` реальный источник находится в
+`/opt/hayabusa/state/latest-intake.json`. CLI читает `report_dir`, анализирует
+`timeline.jsonl`, logon summaries и строит normalized finding:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox ingest-hayabusa \
+  --intake /opt/hayabusa/state/latest-intake.json \
+  --min-severity medium \
+  --clickhouse-url http://127.0.0.1:8123 \
+  --database analytics_1c
+```
+
+Для автоматического подключения Hayabusa drop/autoprocess:
+
+```bash
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_ENABLED=true
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_BIN=/usr/local/bin/security-finding-inbox
+AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_MIN_SEVERITY=medium
+```
+
+`AW_SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_REQUIRED=false` оставляет forensic pipeline живым,
+если ClickHouse или inbox CLI временно недоступны. В `true`-режиме ошибка
+ingest считается operational failure.
+
+### Real Velociraptor source
+
+Velociraptor artifact JSON/JSONL можно загрузить через generic adapter:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox ingest-velociraptor-json \
+  --input /path/to/velociraptor-artifact.jsonl \
+  --default-severity high \
+  --clickhouse-url http://127.0.0.1:8123 \
+  --database analytics_1c
+```
+
+Adapter ищет стандартные поля `Hostname`, `Artifact`, `Severity`, `Message`,
+`User`, `IP`. Если формат артефакта отличается, используйте normalized
+`security-finding-inbox ingest --input ...`.
+
+## Portal workflow
+
+Open:
+
+```text
+DetMir Portal -> Подозрительные станции
+```
+
+The page shows:
+
+- host/user/IP/department;
+- severity/confidence/score;
+- source/rule;
+- state and latest workflow status;
+- recommended action;
+- workflow buttons.
+
+Portal buttons record only workflow events:
+
+- `decide`: request decision calculation;
+- `plan`: request containment plan;
+- `approve`: operator approval record;
+- `apply`: request to perform apply outside the portal;
+- `rollback`: rollback request record.
+
+The portal does not run `containment-engine`, PowerShell, firewall commands or
+network changes.
+
+## Executor handoff
+
+Executor читает из ClickHouse только те findings, где:
+
+- последний workflow event: `apply_requested`;
+- status: `apply_pending`;
+- ранее есть `approved`;
+- еще нет `executor_apply_succeeded`, `executor_apply_failed`,
+  `executor_refused` или rollback terminal event.
+
+Dry-run executor:
+
+```bash
+security-finding-inbox executor \
+  --once \
+  --dry-run \
+  --containment-engine-bin /usr/local/bin/containment-engine \
+  --policy /etc/activitywatch/containment-policy.json \
+  --management-allowlist 10.10.10.10,10.10.10.11 \
+  --blocked-remote-addresses 10.10.20.0/24,10.10.30.0/24
+```
+
+Linux systemd example for central dry-run/polling mode:
+
+```text
+ops/systemd/aw-security-finding-executor.service
+```
+
+Real local Windows apply is allowed only when all conditions are true:
+
+- executor runs on the target Windows workstation;
+- `--execute-local` is set;
+- `--confirm-execute YES` is set;
+- `--executor-host` or local `COMPUTERNAME` matches finding `host`;
+- containment policy returns `manual_approval_required` or `auto_ready`;
+- management allowlist and blocked remote ranges are explicit;
+- generated Windows Firewall plan has no blockers.
+
+Example on the target Windows host:
+
+```powershell
+security-finding-inbox.exe executor `
+  --once `
+  --execute-local `
+  --confirm-execute YES `
+  --executor-host HOST-EXAMPLE `
+  --containment-engine-bin C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\containment-engine.exe `
+  --policy C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\containment-policy.json `
+  --management-allowlist 10.10.10.10,10.10.10.11 `
+  --blocked-remote-addresses 10.10.20.0/24,10.10.30.0/24
+```
+
+Executor writes `executor_*` workflow events back into ClickHouse. It does not
+update or delete source findings.
+
+## Manual containment handoff
+
+After a finding is approved:
+
+1. Build or review a containment policy/finding.
+2. Run:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine decide \
+  --policy /etc/activitywatch/containment-policy.json \
+  --finding /path/to/finding.json \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+3. Build Windows Firewall request with explicit management allowlist.
+4. Run:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall plan \
+  --request /path/to/windows-firewall-request.json \
+  --pretty > /tmp/fw-plan.json
+```
+
+5. Confirm `blockers=[]`.
+6. Dry-run:
+
+```bash
+containment-engine windows-firewall apply \
+  --plan /tmp/fw-plan.json \
+  --confirm-apply YES \
+  --pretty
+```
+
+7. Real apply only on the target Windows host:
+
+```powershell
+containment-engine.exe windows-firewall apply `
+  --plan C:\Temp\fw-plan.json `
+  --confirm-apply YES `
+  --execute-local `
+  --pretty
+```
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Do not place raw employee logs, secrets, passwords or customer identifiers in
+  findings.
+- Do not treat `apply_requested` as successful containment.
+- Do not run broad `Any`/`LocalSubnet` firewall blocks.
+- Do not enable automatic action for servers/domain controllers.
+- Keep GitHub/portal evidence separate from Russian registry release evidence.
+- Keep DLP optional: Hayabusa/Velociraptor findings can continue while heavy DLP
+  runtime is disabled.

docs/wiki/Hayabusa-Security-Analytics.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ journalctl -u aw-hayabusa-drop.service -n 80 --no-pager
 curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:5602/api/0/dlp/cases/30
 ```
 
-Ожидаемо: `drop` и `incoming` пустые, `latest-intake.json` имеет `status=ok`, `host=SHARKON2025`, а `LastTaskResult` Windows-задачи равен `0`.
+Ожидаемо: `drop` и `incoming` пустые, `latest-intake.json` имеет `status=ok`, `host=<stable-aw-logical-host-id>`, а `LastTaskResult` Windows-задачи равен `0`. Для текущего DetMir production historical logical id может оставаться `SHARKON2025`, даже если физический `COMPUTERNAME` RDP-сервера изменён.
 
 ## Что получает оператор
 

ops/systemd/aw-security-finding-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AWatch-rus Security Finding Inbox executor
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/activitywatch/aw-server.env
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/security-finding-inbox executor \
+  --poll-seconds 30 \
+  --dry-run
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=10
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=full
+ProtectHome=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/activitywatch /var/lock
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

scripts/containment_shadow_smoke.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+ENGINE="${CONTAINMENT_ENGINE_BIN:-}"
+POLICY="${1:-$ROOT_DIR/configs/containment-policy.example.json}"
+FINDING="${2:-$ROOT_DIR/configs/containment-finding.example.json}"
+FIREWALL_REQUEST="${3:-$ROOT_DIR/configs/windows-firewall-containment-request.example.json}"
+TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/containment-shadow-smoke.XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT
+
+if [[ -z "$ENGINE" ]]; then
+  for candidate in \
+    "${CARGO_TARGET_DIR:-}/debug/containment-engine" \
+    "${CARGO_TARGET_DIR:-}/release/containment-engine" \
+    "$ROOT_DIR/adk-rust/target/debug/containment-engine" \
+    "$ROOT_DIR/adk-rust/target/release/containment-engine" \
+    "/usr/local/bin/containment-engine"; do
+    if [[ -n "$candidate" && -x "$candidate" ]]; then
+      ENGINE="$candidate"
+      break
+    fi
+  done
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$ENGINE" ]]; then
+  printf 'containment-engine binary not found. Build: cargo build --manifest-path adk-rust/Cargo.toml -p containment-engine\n' >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+validate_payload() {
+  local expected_status="$1"
+  python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+
+expected_status = sys.argv[1]
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+if payload.get("would_mutate") is not False:
+    raise SystemExit("containment smoke failed: would_mutate must be false")
+status = payload.get("decision_status")
+if status != expected_status:
+    raise SystemExit(f"containment smoke failed: expected {expected_status!r}, got {status!r}")
+print(f"containment_shadow_smoke=ok status={status}")
+' "$expected_status"
+}
+
+disabled_out="$("$ENGINE" decide --policy "$POLICY" --finding "$FINDING" --pretty)"
+printf '%s\n' "$disabled_out"
+validate_payload "disabled" <<<"$disabled_out"
+
+shadow_policy="$TMP_DIR/containment-policy-shadow.json"
+python3 - "$POLICY" "$shadow_policy" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+payload = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
+payload["enabled"] = True
+payload["mode"] = "shadow"
+json.dump(payload, open(sys.argv[2], "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
+PY
+
+shadow_out="$("$ENGINE" decide --policy "$shadow_policy" --finding "$FINDING" --pretty)"
+printf '%s\n' "$shadow_out"
+validate_payload "shadow_recommended" <<<"$shadow_out"
+
+firewall_plan="$TMP_DIR/windows-firewall-plan.json"
+"$ENGINE" windows-firewall plan --request "$FIREWALL_REQUEST" --pretty >"$firewall_plan"
+cat "$firewall_plan"
+
+python3 - "$firewall_plan" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+payload = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
+if payload.get("executor") != "windows_firewall":
+    raise SystemExit("firewall smoke failed: executor must be windows_firewall")
+if payload.get("blockers"):
+    raise SystemExit(f"firewall smoke failed: unexpected blockers {payload['blockers']!r}")
+if not payload.get("apply_commands") or not payload.get("rollback_commands"):
+    raise SystemExit("firewall smoke failed: apply/rollback commands must exist")
+print("windows_firewall_plan_smoke=ok")
+PY
+
+firewall_apply_out="$("$ENGINE" windows-firewall apply --plan "$firewall_plan" --confirm-apply YES --pretty)"
+printf '%s\n' "$firewall_apply_out"
+
+python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+if payload.get("execution_status") != "dry_run_commands_ready":
+    raise SystemExit("firewall apply smoke failed: expected dry_run_commands_ready")
+if payload.get("would_mutate") is not False:
+    raise SystemExit("firewall apply smoke failed: dry-run must not mutate")
+print("windows_firewall_apply_dry_run_smoke=ok")
+' <<<"$firewall_apply_out"

scripts/security_finding_inbox_smoke.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+BIN="${SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_BIN:-}"
+SAMPLE="${1:-$ROOT_DIR/configs/security/security-finding.example.json}"
+TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/security-finding-inbox-smoke.XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT
+
+if [[ -z "$BIN" ]]; then
+  for candidate in \
+    "${CARGO_TARGET_DIR:-}/debug/security-finding-inbox" \
+    "${CARGO_TARGET_DIR:-}/release/security-finding-inbox" \
+    "$ROOT_DIR/adk-rust/target/debug/security-finding-inbox" \
+    "$ROOT_DIR/adk-rust/target/release/security-finding-inbox" \
+    "/usr/local/bin/security-finding-inbox"; do
+    if [[ -n "$candidate" && -x "$candidate" ]]; then
+      BIN="$candidate"
+      break
+    fi
+  done
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$BIN" ]]; then
+  printf 'security-finding-inbox binary not found. Build: cargo build --manifest-path adk-rust/Cargo.toml -p security-finding-inbox\n' >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+"$BIN" schema | grep -q 'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS analytics_1c.security_findings'
+"$BIN" validate --input "$SAMPLE" | python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+assert payload["ok"] is True
+assert payload["rows"] == 1
+assert payload["finding_ids"][0].startswith("sf-")
+print("security_finding_validate=ok")
+'
+
+"$BIN" ingest --input "$SAMPLE" --dry-run | python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+assert payload["ok"] is True
+assert payload["dry_run"] is True
+assert payload["rows"] == 1
+print("security_finding_ingest_dry_run=ok")
+'
+
+mkdir -p "$TMP_DIR/hayabusa-report"
+cat >"$TMP_DIR/hayabusa-report/timeline.jsonl" <<'EOF'
+{"Level":"high","RuleTitle":"PowerShell Credential Dump","Timestamp":"2026-06-25T10:00:00Z"}
+{"Level":"crit","RuleTitle":"Suspicious Credential Access","Timestamp":"2026-06-25T10:01:00Z"}
+EOF
+cat >"$TMP_DIR/hayabusa-report/logon-summary-failed.csv" <<'EOF'
+header
+1
+2
+EOF
+cat >"$TMP_DIR/latest-intake.json" <<EOF
+{
+  "host": "HOST-EXAMPLE",
+  "status": "ok",
+  "intake_id": "smoke-intake-001",
+  "package_path": "$TMP_DIR/HOST-EXAMPLE.zip",
+  "sha256": "demo",
+  "report_dir": "$TMP_DIR/hayabusa-report"
+}
+EOF
+"$BIN" ingest-hayabusa --intake "$TMP_DIR/latest-intake.json" --min-severity low --dry-run | python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+assert payload["ok"] is True
+assert payload["dry_run"] is True
+assert payload["rows"] == 1
+print("security_finding_hayabusa_ingest_dry_run=ok")
+'
+
+cat >"$TMP_DIR/velociraptor.jsonl" <<'EOF'
+{"Hostname":"HOST-EXAMPLE","Artifact":"Windows.Hayabusa.Monitoring","Severity":"high","Message":"Velociraptor smoke finding","User":"user-example"}
+EOF
+"$BIN" ingest-velociraptor-json --input "$TMP_DIR/velociraptor.jsonl" --dry-run | python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+assert payload["ok"] is True
+assert payload["dry_run"] is True
+assert payload["rows"] == 1
+print("security_finding_velociraptor_ingest_dry_run=ok")
+'
+
+"$BIN" workflow \
+  --finding-id sf-demo \
+  --event-type approved \
+  --actor smoke \
+  --comment "dry-run approval" \
+  --dry-run | python3 -c '
+import json
+import sys
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+assert payload["ok"] is True
+assert payload["dry_run"] is True
+assert payload["event_type"] == "approved"
+print("security_finding_workflow_dry_run=ok")
+'
+
+"$BIN" executor --help >/dev/null
+printenv SECURITY_FINDING_INBOX_SKIP_EXECUTOR_SMOKE >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+  printf 'security_finding_executor_cli=ok\n'