feat(dfir): add hayabusa forensic workflow integration
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# Hayabusa Operator and IB Guide 2026-05-14
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This document explains the role of Hayabusa inside `AW-rus` for operators and IB.
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## What Hayabusa adds
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Hayabusa adds a bounded DFIR layer for Windows Event Log analysis:
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- EVTX-based timeline review
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- Sigma-based detection enrichment
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- logon and activity context around an already interesting host or incident
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- forensic artifacts that can be attached to case review
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It is useful when `AW-rus` or DLP already surfaced something worth investigating further.
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## What Hayabusa does not replace
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Hayabusa is not:
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- a replacement for normal `AW-rus` runtime monitoring
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- a replacement for DLP policy enforcement
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- a real-time SIEM
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- a reason to copy raw Sigma output into AW buckets or case comments
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The normal operational path remains:
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- `AW-rus` for activity/runtime visibility
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- DLP collectors and policy engine for signal generation
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- case management for operator workflow
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- Hayabusa for bounded forensic enrichment
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## When operators should run it
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Recommended cases:
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- high-severity DLP incidents
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- repeated suspicious incidents on one host or user
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- print, USB, file export, or email activity that needs Windows event corroboration
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- investigation requests from IB after an incident is already known
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Do not run it for every minor signal. It is meant for escalation and investigation, not daily noise.
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## Operator workflow
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1. Export EVTX package on Windows:
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```powershell
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powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\export-evtx-for-hayabusa.ps1
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```
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2. Transfer the resulting zip package to `10.10.10.13`.
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3. Run server-side processing:
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```bash
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aw-hayabusa accept --package /path/to/HOST-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.zip --host HOST
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aw-hayabusa process-inbox --mode incident
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```
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Or use the Telegram operator path:
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```text
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/aw_dfir /path/to/HOST-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.zip HOST [CASE_ID] [MODE]
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```
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4. If a case already exists, link only bounded metadata to the case.
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## Where artifacts live
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Windows export staging:
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- `C:\ProgramData\AWatch-rus\forensics\evtx-exports`
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Server-side intake and reports:
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- incoming packages:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/inbox/incoming`
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- transient staging:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/inbox/staging`
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- archived raw packages:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/archive/packages/<HOST>/`
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- archived extracted payloads:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/archive/extracted/<HOST>/<INTAKE_ID>/payload/`
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- reports:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/reports/<HOST>/<UTC_TIMESTAMP>_<MODE>[_LABEL]/`
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- run state and logs:
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- `/opt/hayabusa/state`
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## What is stored in AW-rus
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Only bounded metadata is attached to a case:
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- tool
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- host
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- mode
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- status
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- intake id
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- package path
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- sha256
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- report directory
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- summary path
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- timeline path
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- manifest path
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- linked timestamp
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- link source
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Raw forensic output stays under `/opt/hayabusa`.
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## Retention and storage notes
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Windows-side export retention:
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- controlled by `aw_windows_evtx_retention_days`
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- default: `14` days
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Windows-side export channels:
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- controlled by `aw_windows_evtx_channels`
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- default set:
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- `Security`
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- `System`
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- `Application`
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- `Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational`
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- `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational`
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- `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational`
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Server-side storage:
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- kept outside standard AW buckets
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- kept outside normal DLP screenshot artifacts
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- intended for forensic review, not for routine dashboarding
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## IB view
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From an IB perspective, Hayabusa in this project is:
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- a post-incident enrichment layer
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- useful for Windows event corroboration and timeline reconstruction
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- intentionally separated from the main activity-monitoring data plane
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This design keeps the main operator UI readable while preserving forensic detail when needed.
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## Limits and false expectations to avoid
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- Sigma detections depend on the quality and completeness of Windows logging.
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- Missing or weak audit policy reduces value immediately.
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- No EVTX means no meaningful Hayabusa result.
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- A successful Hayabusa run does not prove malicious activity by itself.
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- A clean Hayabusa run does not prove the absence of suspicious behavior.
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- This contour is deliberately not an always-on detector and not a SIEM replacement.
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## Canonical companion docs
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- source and packaging:
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- `docs/hayabusa-source-packaging-2026-05-14.md`
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- server runner:
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- `docs/hayabusa-server-runner-2026-05-14.md`
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- artifact workflow:
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- `docs/hayabusa-artifact-workflow-2026-05-14.md`
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- AW-rus integration:
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- `docs/hayabusa-aw-rus-integration-2026-05-14.md`
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- Windows EVTX export:
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- `docs/windows-hayabusa-evtx-export.md`
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